

# Introduction to Mechanism Design and Application to Pose Synchronization



FL08 -17-2

Tatsuya Ibuki



## Outline

- Introduction, Preliminary
- Mechanism Design Problem
- Application to Pose Synchronization
- Conclusion and Future Work



## Introduction

### What is Mechanism Design ?

- In Japanese, this is called “制度設計”
- Developed in economics and game theory
  - ⇒ A branch of economics or game theory

- The study of designing rules of a game or system to achieve a specific outcome, even though each agent may be self-interested.
- Mechanism design is done by setting up a structure in which agents have an incentive to behave according to the rules.
- The resulting mechanism is then said to implement the desired outcome.



## Introduction

### Design Objective

- To achieve basic outcomes such as truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance and social welfare.
- To achieve fairness (minimizing variance between participants' utilities), maximizing the auction holder's revenue, and Pareto efficiency.
- It is sometimes seen to consider mechanism design in order to resist harmful coalitions of players.

### Design Difficulty

Often face trade-off problems between the objectives

- Ex.) It is impossible to guarantee optimal results for all above four outcomes simultaneously in many situations, particularly in markets where buyers can also be sellers.



## Introduction

### Application

- Creation of markets, auctions and so on
- Design of matching algorithms
- Provision of public goods
- Optimal design of taxation schemes by governments

etc...

### Triumph

- Most of triumphs have been yielded in economics.
- Recently, more and more triumphs are achieved in mathematics, computer science, electrotechnology and so on.
- Novel prize in economics in 2007



## Aim of My Study

Mechanism Design  $\xrightarrow{\text{apply}}$  Control Design

**Mechanism Design for Control** —  
To design and impose **individual objectives** and **control rules** on each agent of a group in order to achieve the **specified group objective**

Self-interested      Rules      Outcome

**Aim of my coming study** —  
To design individual objectives and control protocols which achieve cooperative tasks such as pose synchronization  
⇒ consider mechanism design for cooperative control

Next, introduce mechanism design problem by using previous work



## Preliminary

Tokyo Institute of Technology

- Graph : A set of connections (Edges) of between Objects (Vertice)

Vertex (node) : Agent      Edge : Information Flow

-Directed Graph (Fig. 1) : the information flows from agent  $j$  to  $i$

-Undirected Graph (Fig. 2) : the information flows to both directions



Fig. 1 Directed Graph




Fig. 2 Undirected Graph

- Directed Graph

-strongly connected (Fig. 3) :

there is a directly path connecting any two distinct nodes

- Undirected Graph

-connected :

there is a path between any two distinct nodes




Fig. 3 Strongly Connected Graph

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 7



## Preliminary

Tokyo Institute of Technology

$G = (V, E)$  : directed (or undirected) graph

$V = \{1, \dots, n\}$  : set of nodes (agents)

$E \subseteq V \times V$  : set of edges (an edge of  $G$  :  $e_{ij} = (i, j)$ )

$N_i = \{j \in V \mid (j, i) \in E\}$  : set of neighbors of node  $i$   
(the set of nodes whose information node  $i$  can get)

$$\text{Graph Laplacian} : L = [L_{ij}] = \begin{cases} |N_i| & i = j \\ -1 & j \in N_i \\ 0 & j \notin N_i \end{cases}$$

$|N_i|$  : the number of neighbors of agent  $i$

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 8



## Preliminary

Tokyo Institute of Technology

### Consensus

Convergence of certain values to a common value is called consensus

### Consensus Problem

Determine a protocol which makes certain quantities of interest converge to a same value

### Group Decision Value

The value obtained by achieving consensus

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 9



## Outline

Tokyo Institute of Technology

- Introduction, Preliminary
- Mechanism Design Problem
- Application to Pose Synchronization
- Conclusion and Future Work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 10



## Mechanism Design Problem

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consensus Problem : D. Bauso et al. [6]

Dynamics

$$\dot{x}_i(t) = u_i(t)$$

$x_i$  : agent  $i$ 's state

$u_i$  : agent  $i$ 's input

Information graph : undirected and connected

Goal

Consensus:

Convergence of certain quantities of interest converge to a **specified same value**  
desired group decision value

First, determine the following three elements for mechanism design

- A group Objective(outcome)
- Rules(individual objectives)
- Each agent's utilities(rules to determine next action)

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 11



## Mechanism Design Problem

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consensus Problem : D. Bauso et al. [6]

Group Objective

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_i(t) = f(x(0)) \quad \forall i$$

$x(t) = [x_1(t) \ \dots \ x_n(t)]^T$  : states vector

$f(\cdot) \in \mathfrak{R}$  : agreement function (to get group decision value)

In [6], consider the case  $f(x(t))$  is time invariant

Rule

Prepare the following individual objective function

$$J(x_i(t), x^{(i)}(t), u_i(t)) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \int_0^T (F(x_i(t), x^{(i)}(t)) + \rho u_i^2(t)) dt$$

$$x^{(i)} := \begin{cases} x_1^{(i)} & \dots & x_n^{(i)} \\ x_j & j \in N_i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \rho > 0$$

$F : \mathfrak{R} \times \mathfrak{R}^n \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  is a nonnegative penalty function that measures the deviation of  $x_i$  from neighbors' states (the same function for each agent)

A protocol is said **optimal** if each  $u_i$  optimizes the corresponding individual objective

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 12



## Mechanism Design Problem

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consensus Problem : D. Bauso et al. [6]

### Utility

Each agent chooses  $u_i$  to minimize its own individual objective function  $J_i$

### Mechanism Design Problem [6]

For any agreement function  $f(\cdot)$ , determine a penalty function  $F(\cdot)$  such that there exists an optimal consensus protocol  $u(\cdot)$  with respect to  $f(x(0))$  for any initial state  $x(0)$ .

Group objective : to converge all agents states to a desired value  $f(x(0))$

Rule : individual objective function  $J_i$

Utility : to minimize each individual objective function

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 13



## Mechanism Design Problem

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consensus Problem : D. Bauso et al. [6]

Solving the problem is a difficult task.

→ translate it into a sequence of more tractable problems

### Receding Horizon Control Scheme

$$J_i(x_i(t), x^{(i)}(t), u_i(t)) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \int_0^T (F(x_i(t), x^{(i)}(t)) + \rho u_i^2(t)) dt$$

$$\Rightarrow \hat{J}_i(x_i(t_k), x^{(i)}(t_k), \hat{u}_i(\tau, t_k)) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \int_{t_k}^T (F(\hat{x}_i(\tau, t_k), x^{(i)}(\tau, t_k)) + \rho \hat{u}_i^2(\tau, t_k)) d\tau \dots (1)$$

$$\text{subject to } \begin{cases} \dot{\hat{x}}_i(\tau, t_k) = \hat{u}_i(\tau, t_k), & \dot{\hat{x}}_i(\tau, t_k) = \hat{u}_i(\tau, t_k) = 0 \quad \forall j \in N_i \\ \hat{x}_i(t_k, t_k) = x_i(t_k), & \hat{x}_j(t_k, t_k) = x_j(t_k) \quad \forall j \in N_i \end{cases}$$

naive assumption  
initial states of each step

$t_k$  : discrete time,  $\delta = t_{k+1} - t_k$  : one-step action horizon,  $t_0$  : initial time  $\Leftrightarrow t_k = t_0 + \delta k, k = 0, 1, \dots$

$\hat{x}_i(\tau, t_k), \hat{x}^{(i)}(\tau, t_k)$  : predicted state of agent  $i$  and of his neighbors respectively  $\tau \geq t_k$

$$\Rightarrow \text{find } \hat{u}_i^*(\tau, t_k) = \arg \min \hat{J}_i(x_i(t_k), x^{(i)}(t_k), \hat{u}_i(\tau, t_k))$$

• take the limit for  $\delta \rightarrow 0$  to find an approximate solution to the mechanism design problem of the given receding horizon solution

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 14



## Mechanism Design Problem

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consensus Problem : D. Bauso et al. [6]

### Theorem 1 [6]

Consider an agent  $i$  with first-order dynamics, at times  $t_k = 0, 1, \dots$ , assign it an objective function as (1) whose penalty function is

$$F(\hat{x}_i(\tau, t_k)) = \rho \left( \frac{1}{dg/dx_i} \sum_{j \in N_i} (\theta(x_j(t_k)) - \theta(\hat{x}_i(\tau, t_k)))^2 \right)$$

Where  $g(\cdot) : \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  is increasing,  $\theta(\cdot) : \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  is concave, and  $1/dg(y)/dy$  is convex. Then the following control policy is the unique optimal solution to the mechanism design problem of receding horizon control scheme ver.,

$$\hat{u}_i^*(\tau, t_k) = u_i(x_i(\tau)) = -\frac{1}{dg/dx_i} \sum_{j \in N_i} (\theta(x_j(t_k)) - \theta(\hat{x}_i(\tau, t_k)))$$

$g(\cdot)$  : significant function for determining the group decision value  $\sum_i g(x_i(t)) = \text{const.} \rightarrow f(\cdot) : \text{const.}$

Proof : omitted.

- Use naive assumption :  $\hat{x}^{(i)}(\tau, t_k) = x^{(i)}(t_k), \forall \tau \geq t_k$  (the states of neighbors are constant over the planning horizon)
- Use the Pontryagin minimum principle for determining an optimal control protocol

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 15



## Mechanism Design Problem

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consensus Problem : D. Bauso et al. [6]

Examples:

- Condition
- Information graph is undirected and connected
  - $u_i$  minimizes  $J_i$

assign	calculate		Group decision value
$F(x_i, x^{(i)})$	$u_i(x_i, x^{(i)})$	$f(x(0))$	
$\left( \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i) \right)^2$	$\sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i)$	$\frac{1}{n} \sum_i x_i(0)$	Arithmetic Mean
$\left( x_i \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i) \right)^2$	$x_i \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i)$	$\sqrt{\prod_i x_i(0)}$	Geometric Mean
$\left( x_i^2 \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i) \right)^2$	$-x_i^2 \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i)$	$\frac{n}{\sum_i \frac{1}{x_i(0)}}$	Harmonic Mean
$\left( \frac{1}{2x_i} \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i) \right)^2$	$\frac{1}{2x_i} \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i)$	$\sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \sum_i x_i^2(0)}$	Mean of Order 2

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 16



## Outline

Tokyo Institute of Technology

- Introduction, Preliminary
- Mechanism Design Problem
- Application to Pose Synchronization
- Conclusion and Future Work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 17



## Previous Work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Pose Synchronization [5,11]

### Kinematic Model

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{x}_i \\ \dot{y}_i \\ \dot{\theta}_i \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \cos \theta_i & -\sin \theta_i & 0 \\ \sin \theta_i & \cos \theta_i & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_{xi} \\ v_{yi} \\ \omega_i \end{bmatrix} \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad \dots (2)$$

$x_i, y_i \in \mathfrak{R}$  : position

$\theta_i \in \mathfrak{R}$  : rotation angle

$v_{xi}, v_{yi} \in \mathfrak{R}$  : body velocity

$\omega_i \in \mathfrak{R}$  : body angular velocity

Control Input :  $v_{xi}, v_{yi}, \omega_i$




Fig. 4 Rigid Body Motion

$\Sigma_w$  : inertial coordinate frame

$\Sigma_i$  : body-fixed coordinate frame

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 18



## Previous Work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

### Pose Synchronization

A group of agents is said to pose synchronize when all agents converge to the same position and orientation between the agents.

#### Assumptions

- A1 :  $|\theta_i(t)| < \frac{\pi}{2} \quad \forall i, t$
- A2 : Information graph is fixed, **directed** and strongly connected
- A3 : Information graph is fixed, **undirected** and connected

#### Theorem 2

Consider the system with  $n$  rigid bodies represented by (2). Under the assumptions A1 and A2, the following control input achieves pose synchronization.

$$\begin{bmatrix} v_{xi} \\ v_{yi} \\ \omega_i \end{bmatrix} = \sum_{j \in N_i} \begin{bmatrix} \cos \theta_j & \sin \theta_j & 0 \\ -\sin \theta_j & \cos \theta_j & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_j - x_i \\ y_j - y_i \\ \sin(\theta_j - \theta_i) \end{bmatrix} \quad \dots(3)$$

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 19



## Application to Pose Synchronization

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consider to apply mechanism design problem to pose synchronization problem

**Group Objective** : desired group decision value

⇒ Need to know the convergence value of pose synchronization  
Group decision value :  $\alpha_x, \alpha_y, \alpha_\theta$

$$\text{Eq. (2), (3)} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \begin{bmatrix} \dot{x}_i \\ \dot{y}_i \\ \dot{\theta}_i \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i) \\ \sum_{j \in N_i} (y_j - y_i) \\ \sum_{j \in N_i} \sin(\theta_j - \theta_i) \end{bmatrix} \quad \dots(4)$$

As for  $x_j, y_j$ , we can interpret (4) as the consensus problem considered in [1].

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 20



## Previous Work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Consensus Problem : R.Olfati-Saber et al. [1]

Information graph is **undirected** and **connected**

$$(\alpha_x \quad \alpha_y) = \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_i x_i(0) \quad \frac{1}{n} \sum_i y_i(0) \right)$$

Group decision value is the average of all agents' initial positions.

Information graph is **directed** and **strongly connected**

$$(\alpha_x \quad \alpha_y) = \left( \frac{\sum_i \gamma_i x_i(0)}{\sum_i \gamma_i} \quad \frac{\sum_i \gamma_i y_i(0)}{\sum_i \gamma_i} \right)$$

Group decision value is the weighted average of all agents' initial positions.

$\gamma := [\gamma_1 \quad \dots \quad \gamma_n]^T, \forall \gamma_i > 0$  : a left eigenvectors of  $L$  corresponding to eigenvalue 0 whose all elements are positive [4]

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 21



## Application to Pose Synchronization

Tokyo Institute of Technology

In the case that an information graph is undirected and connected, we can say that the control inputs about positions in Theorem 2 is one of the solutions of mechanism design problem corresponding to

$$\begin{cases} F_1(x_i, x^{(i)}) = \left( \sum_{j \in N_i} (x_j - x_i) \right)^2 \\ F_2(y_i, y^{(i)}) = \left( \sum_{j \in N_i} (y_j - y_i) \right)^2 \end{cases}$$

where each agent's utility is that each input minimizes  $F_1$  and  $F_2$ .

$$\begin{aligned} x^{(i)} &\in \mathfrak{R}^n \\ x^{(i)} &= \begin{cases} x_j & j \in N_i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \begin{aligned} y^{(i)} &\in \mathfrak{R}^n \\ y^{(i)} &= \begin{cases} y_j & j \in N_i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$

Lastly, analyze the group decision value about **attitudes** for preliminary to future work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 22



## Group Decision Value about Attitudes

Tokyo Institute of Technology

### •Undirected Information Graph

#### Theorem 3

Assume all the conditions except for replacing A2 with A3 in theorem 2 hold. Then, the control input (3) achieves pose synchronization and the group decision value about attitudes will be the average of all agents' initial attitudes. Namely,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \theta_i(t) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \theta_i \quad \forall i$$

**Proof** (one about convergence to a same value is omitted) :

Undirected graph  $\Rightarrow \sum_i \dot{\theta}_i(t) = \sum_i \sum_{j \in N_i} \sin(\theta_j(t) - \theta_i(t)) = 0 \quad \forall t$

$\Rightarrow \sum_i \theta_i(t)$  is an invariant quantity  $\alpha_\theta$  : group decision value about attitudes

$\Rightarrow \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \sum_i \theta_i(t) = \sum_i \alpha_\theta = \sum_i \theta_i(0)$

$\Rightarrow \alpha_\theta = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \theta_i(0)$  □

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 23




## Group Decision Value about Positions

Tokyo Institute of Technology

### Simulation


Initial States

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_1(0) &= \frac{\pi}{3}, & \theta_2(0) &= \frac{\pi}{3} \\ \theta_3(0) &= 0, & \theta_4(0) &= \frac{\pi}{3} \end{aligned}$$



Group Decision Value

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_\theta &= \frac{\frac{\pi}{3} + \frac{\pi}{3} + 0 + \frac{\pi}{3}}{4} \\ &= \frac{\pi}{4} \\ &\approx 0.785 \text{ [rad]} \end{aligned}$$



Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 24



## Group Decision Value about Attitudes

Tokyo Institute of Technology

This results can be applied to the attitude coordination problem with two-wheeled mobile robots [11].

Analysis of a group decision value about attitudes for directed information graphs is in progress...

I've not achieved the individual objective function about attitudes. It is difficult task because there exists sinusoidal term in (3).

Mechanism design problem with directed graphs is future work...

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 25



## Outline

Tokyo Institute of Technology

- Introduction, Preliminary
- Mechanism Design Problem
- Application to Pose Synchronization
- Conclusion and Future Work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 26



## Conclusion and Future Work

Tokyo Institute of Technology

### Conclusion

- Introduce mechanism design
- Try to apply mechanism design to pose synchronization
- Analyze a group decision value about attitudes

### Future Work

- Study of mechanism design, game theory and potential game
- Analysis of the group decision value about attitude under weakly conditions
- Experiment of robust control with a wheeled inverted pendulum

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 27



## References

Tokyo Institute of Technology

- [1] R. Olfati-Saber and R. M. Murray, "Consensus problems in networks of agents with switching topology and time-delays," IEEE Trans. Autom. Control, pp. 1520-1533, 2004.
- [2] R. Olfati-Saber, J. Alex Fax, and Richard M. Murray, "Consensus and Cooperation in Networked Multi-Agent Systems," in Proc. of the IEEE, pp. 215-233, 2007.
- [3] W. Ren, R. Beard and E. M. Atkins, "A survey of consensus problems in multi-agent coordination," in Proc. of the American Control Conference, pp. 1859-1864, 2005.
- [4] W. Ren and R. W. Beard, "Distributed Consensus in Multi-vehicle Cooperative Control," Springer, 2008.
- [5] Y. Igarashi, T. Hatanaka, M. Fujita and M. W. Spong, "Passivity-based Pose Synchronization and Flocking in Three Dimensions," IEEE Trans. Autom. Control, 2008 (under review).
- [6] D. Bauso, L. Giarre and R. Pesenti, "Nonlinear protocols for optimal distributed consensus in networks of dynamic agents," Systems and Control Letters, pp. 918-928, 2006.

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 28



## References

Tokyo Institute of Technology

- [7] D. Bauso, L. Giarre and R. Pesenti, "Mechanism design for optimal consensus problems," DINFO Technical Report 3/06, submitted to Conference on Decision and Control, 2006.
- [8] D. Bauso, L. Giarre and R. Pesenti, "Attitude Alignment of a Team of UAVs under Decentralized Information Structure," in Proc. of the IEEE Conference on Controls and Applications, pp. 486-491, 2003.
- [9] J. R. Marden, G. Arslan and J. S. Shamma, "Cooperative Control and Potential Games," 2008.
- [10] 宇井貴志, "ポテンシャルゲームの基本的性質," 一橋ゲーム理論ワークショップ, 2007.
- [11] 伊吹竜也, "車輪型移動ロボットを用いた位置姿勢同期制御に関する研究," 卒業論文, 2008.

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Fujita Laboratory 29